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2.1 Introduction
Art museums provide a classic example of organizations operating with
multiple objectives. On the one hand, many American museums take as
their central function the education of the populace. At the same time,
there is a long tradition in museum management of conservation and ap-
peal to the narrower elite. In the past decade, the balance between these ob-
jectives seems to have tilted in favor of the broader populace. In writing of
this change, one museum activist, Kenneth Hudson, has argued: “The
most fundamental change that has aﬀected museums is the now almost
universal conviction that they exist in order to serve the public” (Kotler
and Kotler 2001, 171). Sociologists have explored this tension at some
length. D’Harnoncourt et al. (1991), for example, describe the movement
of art museums from secluded temples of culture to the present-day more
public institutions. Grana (1971) similarly contrasts patron-oriented mu-
seums, focused on “men of leisure from the upper classes,” with public-
oriented ones.
This paper uses cross-sectional and time-series data on U.S. museum ﬁ-
nances and operating characteristics to explore the eﬀect of governance
structure on performance. We are particularly interested in whether the
ownership structure of a museum inﬂuences the balance it strikes among
competing constituents. Increasingly, economists have come to appreciate
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Does Governance Matter?
The Case of Art Museums
Sharon Oster and William N. Goetzmannthe role played by governance structures on decision making in organiza-
tions, and the diﬀerentiated structure of the industry makes museums an
excellent case study.
2.2 The Role of Museums
We begin our discussion by considering the objective function of the typ-
ical museum. In the literature, there are three oft-cited museum goals: art
preservation, education of the populace, and the providing of a social sig-
nal for the elite of a community. The ﬁrst two of these goals appear fre-
quently in the mission statements of museums. The mission statement of
the Portland Art Museum in Oregon is typical: “The mission of the Port-
land Art Museum is to serve the public by providing access to art of en-
during quality, by educating a diverse audience about art and by collecting
and presenting a wide range of art for the enrichment of present and future
generations.” The opening lines of the mission statement of the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts strike a similar theme: “The Museum of Fine Arts
houses and preserves preeminent collections and aspires to serve a wide va-
riety of people through direct encounters with works of art.”1 The interest
in both art preservation and education for the public are clear.
The role of museums in reinforcing a social elite within a city is less of-
ten articulated in mission statements. Yet, until well into the twentieth cen-
tury, most American museums depended on private philanthropic dollars
for their support (Anheier and Toepler 1998, 235). Indeed, wealthy indus-
trialists, to whom Dimaggio refers as “cultural capitalists,” founded many
of our most well-known museums (1986). Dimaggio describes in some de-
tail the way that these industrialists, in cities like Boston, used art institu-
tions to build cultural boundaries separating themselves from the rest of
society. As Temin suggests, displaying one’s art validates both a patron’s
possessions and his or her position in society (1991). Consequently, one
might expect that the more aﬄuent the society, the greater the need to sig-
nal taste through support and display of the arts.
The growth of art museums was thus based not only on an aesthetic tra-
dition in American society, but upon a philanthropic one. John Ingham
(1997) and Ruth Krueger Meyer and Madeleine Fidell Beaufort (1997), in
an exhibition catalogue to a major exhibition, Collection in the Gilded Age:
Art and Patronage in Pittsburgh: 1890–1910,describe the art-collecting and
philanthropic activities of Gilded-Age Pittsburgh through the lenses of
class and society. Wealthy Pittsburgh families vied with each other to cre-
ate spectacular collections of European art and also, in many cases, made
gifts of these collections to the public. Andrew Carnegie, the city’s (and
perhaps the nation’s) wealthiest citizen at the time, led by example in do-
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1. See the Web mission statement at http://207.127.106.123/mission.nating much of his wealth in order to improve the access of Pittsburgh’s cit-
izens to higher arts and education (Ingham; Meyer and Beaufort). Subse-
quent gifts by leading Pittsburgh citizens enriched the artistic horizon of
the nation as a whole. For example, Andrew Mellon’s collection became
the core of the National Gallery of Art, and Henry Clay Frick founded the
Frick Collection of New York.
While the Gilded Age was an important period for museum founding
and support, patronage of the arts through museum foundation has con-
tinued vigorously since. Figure 2.1 is a chart of museum-founding dates
from the sample we study in this paper. It suggests that the most active pe-
riods for museum founding appear to have been the two decades preceding
and the two decades following the Second World War. In fact, this prob-
ably  understates the contributions of the most recent era. The ﬁgure
showsa tailing-oﬀat the end of the sample period that is most likely due to
younger museums’ not reporting statistical information to the Association
of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) as commonly as more established in-
stitutions. Not only was the “birth process” of museums sustained through
the last century, but the social context of arts patronage has also continued
to be an important factor in museum management. Museums today, as
in the past, rely upon gifts for collection development and operations
support, and wealthy donors and founders remain key constituents of
American art museums. The continuation of the philanthropic tradition—
founded on the Gilded-Age sense of civic duty and, to some extent, main-
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Fig. 2.1 The distribution of founding dates for museums in the 1989 and 1999
AAMD sample
Sample: 1989 and 1999 AAMD with reported founding information
Note: Founding dates were collected from annual AAMD directories, as available.tenance of social position through public giving—is an important eco-
nomic foundation for art museums. Indeed, in this paper, we test the extent
to which urban concentrations of wealth are related to institutional re-
liance upon gifts and donations.
Consider now the role of governance structure in determining how mu-
seums pursue their varied objectives and balance the interests of their con-
stituents. Approximately one-third of the art museums in the United States
are public institutions. These public museums were most typically founded
with service to the public in mind and are likely to emphasize public atten-
dance as an objective. The remaining two-thirds of American museums
are overwhelmingly nonproﬁt, but within this pool there are institutional
diﬀerences, such as between university-based museums and free-standing
nonproﬁts. University art museums, which emerged largely in the nine-
teenth century, were principally intended to serve the students and aca-
demic staﬀs of their own institutions (Boylan 1999). While many university
museums have clearly broadened their reach to serve the general public,
one might well expect some residual focus on the less popular end of the art
spectrum and on curatorial and educational functions as opposed to mass
appeal. Thus, we hypothesize that public museums will service the general
public the most and university museums the least as they go about their re-
spective businesses.
In pursuing these three objectives, museums have a number of instru-
ments available. To the extent that public museums emphasize public ac-
cess, one would expect them to maintain low prices, focus collection eﬀorts
on broadly accessible art and programs, and emphasize more popular ex-
hibitions. University-based museums would be expected to focus on more
sophisticated art and programs and be less concerned with keeping admis-
sion prices low for the general public, although free student access might
well be important. Free-standing nonproﬁts, operating without other sup-
port, might be expected to charge higher prices and pay more attention to
the interests of elite donors.
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to gather data directly on many of these
strategic variables. Locating pricing data is, for example, quite problem-
atic. Many museums characterize admissions fees as “suggestions,” where
the suggestion carries varying levels of force at diﬀerent museums. Hence,
while the broad-brush data do support our hypotheses in that low or zero
price levels are correlated with public ownership, it is hard to go much fur-
ther simply looking at this variable. Assessing the collection eﬀorts of mu-
seums on the spectrum of popular versus more esoteric is also diﬃcult, al-
though we have some relevant evidence in section 2.2.3, where we examine
the special exhibits of the various museums.
Two elements of museums operations, space utilization and ﬁnancing,
aﬀord some perspective on the objective functions of museums. Some mea-
sure of the emphasis that a museum places on the various elements of its
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versus exhibitions, for example. The structure of a museum’s ﬁnancing may
also aﬀect the way it pursues various objectives. Finally, we use the atten-
dance levels at museums with diﬀerent ownership structures as an index of
how vigorously these museums are pursuing public education and enter-
tainment over their alternative goals.
2.2.1 Space and Money
The empirical work described in this section of the paper is based on
1999 data collected by the AAMD, the principal art museum membership
organization, consisting of just over 200 museums located in the United
States and Canada. The AAMD conducts annual surveys of its members,
covering a wide range of information about ﬁnances, operations, and mu-
seum collections. While the survey data generally are not publicly avail-
able, we were given access to the data for 1989 and 1999. For the analysis
of space utilization and ﬁnancing in this section of the paper we have used
the 1999 data. In a later analysis of attendance, we use both survey years.
In the full sample, there are 148 U.S. museums in 1989 and 140 in 1999
with substantial institutional overlap between the two years, although
many of the museums have at least some missing data. The museums sur-
veyed are quite diverse, ranging in size, for example, from the Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art in New York, with 1,835 full-time employees in 1999,
to the California State University Art Museum, with only 4 full-time em-
ployees. There is a similarly large range in the attendance ﬁgures. The Na-
tional Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. and the Metropolitan Museum
of Art in New York both attract more than 5 million annual visitors, while
the Yale University Art Gallery has a more modest 50,000. The summary
statistics on the sample used in this paper are given in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Summary of Variables
Full Sample Endowment Sample
Mean Range Mean Range
Collection expenditures $1,487,422 $2,055–30,800,000 $1,681,048 $2,055–30,800,000








Other nonproﬁt 55% 60%
Endowment $46,400,000 $114,885–1,020,000,000
Observations 190 166The ﬁrst question we explore using the AAMD data is the way in which
diﬀerent museums use their space. The survey itself distinguishes a number
of space categories. For this analysis, we have focused on three: space for
exhibitions, space designated for educational use, and museum storage
space. Our particular question is whether university-based museums have
more educational space and less storage space than their public or general
nonproﬁt peers.
As we see from table 2.2, just over one-third of the space for the muse-
ums in our sample is used in permanent exhibition space, while a more
modest area is used for either education or the museum store. There is no
diﬀerence by governance type either in exhibition space or in storage
space. Simple regressions holding overall museum size and age constant
conﬁrm the results of table 2.2, revealing no inﬂuence from governance.
The data do suggest that nonproﬁt museums are devoting signiﬁcantly
more space to educational uses than are the public museums.
Intable 2.3 we compare revenue sources for the three museum types. The
four major revenue streams of museums are considered: gross earned rev-
enues, which include admission fees (suggested and otherwise), exhibition
fees, museum store sales, and rentals; private philanthropic support, in-
cluding corporate, individual, and foundation; government support; and
ﬁnally, endowment support.
Considerable diﬀerences in the funding patterns of museums by gover-
nance types are clearly revealed in table 2.3. Nonproﬁt, nonuniversity mu-
seums are most dependent on earned income and private support. Public
museums, not surprisingly, depend principally on public support. Univer-
sity museums, with access to university support, are less dependent on any
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Table 2.2 Museum Space Utilization, 1999 Association of Art Museum Directors Survey
Statistically Diﬀerent?
FromF romF r om Nonproﬁt From University
Mean Combined Public Not University Nonproﬁt
Exhibition space/all space
Public museums .331 No No No
Nonproﬁts, not university .342 No No No
University nonproﬁt .345 No No No
Educational space/all space
Public museums .043 Yes Yes No
Nonproﬁt, not university .074 No Yes No
University nonproﬁt .065 No No No
Museum store space/all space
Public .018 No No No
Nonproﬁt/not university .020 No No No
University/nonproﬁt .016 No No Noof the three constituent-based revenue sources than are public or general
nonproﬁt museums.
We explore some of the consequences of these diﬀerent ﬁnancing pat-
terns in the next two sections of the paper as we look at museum attendance
and special exhibitions.
2.2.2 Attendance
Attendance levels are one of the traditional output measures used by
many museums. We now consider how attendance may be inﬂuenced by
governance. While governance is expected to inﬂuence the aggressiveness
with which museums pursue audiences, characteristics of the collection it-
self likely aﬀect its inherent attractiveness to the public. Finally, since mu-
seums deliver their output on site, we expect the city characteristics to help
determine demand. Here we ask: Are museums like Wal-Mart, where all
that really matters for attracting customers is the organization’s location?
Or will a museum attract its own audience despite location-speciﬁc fea-
tures?
Before we turn to the econometrics, the raw data suggest something of
the governance-attendance relationship. Consider the ratio of attendance
to museum exhibition space as one (admittedly crude) measure of the “pro-
ductivity” of a museum. By this measure, university-based museums are
heavily overrepresented in the list of the twenty least productive museums.
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Table 2.3 Revenue Shares by Governance Structure, 1999 Association of Art Museum
Directors Survey
Statistically Diﬀerent?
From Both From From Nonproﬁt From University
Mean Combined Public Not University Nonproﬁt
Gross earned revenues/all revenues
Public .20 No Yes Yes
Nonproﬁt, not university .25 Yes Yes Yes
University .11 Yes Yes Yes
Private support/all revenues
Public .21 Yes Yes No
Nonproﬁt, not university .33 Yes Yes Yes
University .21 Yes No Yes
Government support/all revenues
Public .41 Yes Yes Yes
Nonproﬁt, not university .12 Yes Yes No
University .08 Yes Yes No
Endowment support/all revenues
Public .08 Yes Yes No
Nonproﬁt, not university .19 Yes Yes Yes
University .12 No No YesThirty-ﬁve percent of the museums on this list are university aﬃliates, as
compared to a population of 23 percent. Among the twenty most space-
productive museums, there is only one university aﬃliate. Similarly, public
museums are overrepresented in the productive class and underrepre-
sented in the underperformers.
In order to explore these diﬀerences across museums more thoroughly,
we estimate a simple model of museum attendance. The attendance levels
at museums are modeled as a production function, where the inputs in-
clude museum and city characteristics. In particular, we estimate a pro-
duction function for museum attendance as follows:
(1) Ait      Xit    Zit    G
where Ait is the attendance at museum i at time t, Xit is a vector of charac-
teristics associated with the collection of museum i at time t, Zit is a vector
of characteristics at time t of the city in which museum i is located, and G
is an indicator for governance structure.
Data on attendance levels and collection characteristics come from the
1989 and 1999 AAMD surveys. The survey data are not without problems,
some of which are described by Rosett (1991) for the earlier 1989 data.
From our point of view, the collection data are most problematic. Ideally,
we would like a measure of the value of the museum collection to use as one
element of the X vector. In the more usual industrial-production-function
context, this would be equivalent to a capital stock ﬁgure. As is well known,
however, museum collections are not valued in the ﬁnancial statements of
museums; indeed, the standard procedure is to list the value of art assets at
$1. In the AAMD survey, there are some data provided on the total value
of a museum’s collection based on insurance coverage.2 These data are
problematic both because insurance readjustments are likely to be sticky
and because many of the museums self-insure and thus drop out of the
sample when we measure collection value this way. Moreover, the censored
museums are not representative since it is many of the large public muse-
ums that self-insure.
An alternative measure of collection value is the current expenditures on
the collection. While we may presume that acquisitions are a major com-
ponent of this category, expenditures on the collection may also include
restoration, framing, and other expenses. Nevertheless, this measure has
the advantage of being “real” data, and is also available for a broader set of
museums. Clearly what we are measuring here is a ﬂow (analogous to in-
vestment) rather than the preferable asset value, although the ﬂow and
stock values do appear to be highly correlated. Using current expenditures
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2. Museum directors were asked to provide information on both the payoﬀof the insurance
and the fraction of the collection covered. These two ﬁgures were then used to generate a to-
tal value ﬁgure.on the collection may also create an endogeneity problem. Increased at-
tendance at a museum typically contributes to the earned income of a mu-
seum, through either admissions fees or concession revenue, and thus may
increase funds available for collections. To deal with this issue, we provide
an alternative estimate of the attendance regression, instrumenting for col-
lection expenditures using the market value of the endowment at the end
of the prior period. Endowment value should be both independent of at-
tendance and correlated with collection expenditures. Since a number of
the museums in the sample do not report endowment values, instrument-
ing in this way reduces the sample size somewhat.
In addition to the variable measuring collection value, we also identify
each collection by type. Narrative summaries of each museum provided by
the AAMD were used to categorize each museum as either survey, modern,
American, or other. We are interested here in whether there is any evidence
of a type bias in American museum goers.
The Z vector contains a set of variables describing the characteristics of
the site of the museum. The typical museum attracts both residents and
tourists. To capture local demand, we used the size of the local population
and the percentage of the population with a college degree. Prior work
(Dimaggio 1987) suggests that educational level is a better predictor of lo-
cal demand than income. We used two measures of tourist demand: hotel
expenditures per capita and mean January temperature. High January
temperatures are intended to capture substitution possibilities for tourists
and local residents alike. We expect that, holding tourism levels constant,
museums do better in climates with cold winters.
Finally, we use dummies to capture governance type, distinguishing
public, university-based, and other nonproﬁt museums. The public muse-
ums include those run by city, state, and federal governments. The set of in-
dependent variables used and the means of the data are given in table 2.1.
We  note that the problem of missing observations reduces the overall
sample considerably, essentially halving the population of 300 museums we
started with.
Table 2.4 reports the results of the estimation. In the estimation, all vari-
ables were transformed to logs, given the expected nonlinear relationship
between attendance and museum and city characteristics. Thus, in this
speciﬁcation, we can think of the coeﬃcient estimates as elasticities. The re-
sults in table 2.4 suggest that both museum and city characteristics matter
for a museum’s ability to draw an audience. Collection expenditures exert
a large, positive, and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on attendance. A 10 percent
increase in the expenditures on collections increases current attendance by
2.5 percent to 4.0 percent, which seems to be a relatively large eﬀect given
the durable nature of collection expenditures. There is some evidence that
survey collections have more drawing power than other collection types.
In fundamental terms, these results suggest that art matters. Our results
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sets, with larger collections drawing more customers. In fact, we can go fur-
ther and use the coeﬃcient estimates to answer the question of what the
economic impact of an increase in collection expenditures would have on
the museum. The data in table 2.1 suggest that in our sample the mean an-
nual collection expenditure is about $1.5 million, while average attendance
in the sample is about 379,000. If we apply the lower elasticity ﬁgure of 0.25
generated in table 2.4, we see that an increased expenditure on the collec-
tion of $150,000 (10 percent) would yield approximately 9,500 more mu-
seum attendees each year. For this to pay oﬀin strictly a one-year economic
impact, each new attendee would have to spend $16 in a visit, which is
likely high. Of course, one would not expect art investment to pay oﬀ this
quickly for a museum or else they would be doing more of it!
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Table 2.4 Attendance Regressions
Independent Variable OLS IV









MSA population (log) .205 .124
(4.53)** (2.00)*
Percent of population with bachelor’s degree (log) .183 .179
(1.22) (1.04)
Hotel expenditures per capita (log) .240 .156
(3.46)** (1.88)












Note: MSA = metropolitan statistical area. OLS = ordinary least squares. IV = instrumental
variables.
**Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
*Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.In terms of location, all of the variables are of the right signs in both re-
gressions, although only the population variable passes the usual signiﬁ-
cance tests in both speciﬁcations. We note again the truncated sample in
the instrumental variable (IV) regressions. The tourist-related variables
suggest that the ideal museum location from an attendance perspective is
a tourist location in a cold area. For Tom Krens’ new Guggenheim mu-
seum branch in Las Vegas, the regression gives a mixed prediction: Based
on tourist beds, Las Vegas looks like a good site; based on January tem-
perature, Krens may have a failure on his hands.
The results further suggest that governance type matters a good deal in
terms of audience attraction. Public museums strongly outdraw nonproﬁt
museums of either type, and university-based museums clearly deliver the
smallest audiences. These results are consistent with the view that public
museums stress public education, while college museums in particular may
focus more on higher education, connoisseurship, and other aspects of the
museum mission. These results further support Hansmann’s (1981) obser-
vations on the diﬀerences in the focus on attendance by performance arts
organizations. We turn now to look directly at the role of special exhibits
in museums of varying ownership types.
2.2.3 The Role of Traveling Exhibitions
Special exhibitions play two important roles for museums. In some
cases, these exhibitions are mounted by a museum’s own curators and rep-
resent the historical vision of that curator, expressing a particular point of
view about a body of work. Thus, at one level, special exhibitions represent
a curatorial research product. On the other hand, some special exhibi-
tions—the blockbusters—serve in large measure as a way to attract large,
new audiences to a museum. Attracting large audiences has ﬁnancial ben-
eﬁts as well. Even those museums that charge no admission fees beneﬁt
through their concession and museum shops from increases in visitorship.
Indeed, for the average museum, revenues from audience-related conces-
sions exceed admissions fees (AAMD Survey 1999).
The traveling special exhibition is particularly interesting in terms of
function. In many cases, exhibitions travel from one museum to another
and provide a way to expose a local audience to new work. For moderate-
sized art museums, some reliance on traveling exhibitions is common. The
St. Louis Art Museum, for example, had thirty-ﬁve special exhibits in the
1990s, 35 percent of which were organized outside of the museum itself, in-
cluding most of the very high-attendance shows. As such, traveling exhibi-
tions are a way of temporarily augmenting a museum collection through, in
eﬀect, leasing more-valuable works from major museums. Much of the dis-
cussion by critics on the changed role of the museum has focused particu-
larly on the use of the special exhibition as a crowd pleaser. By mounting a
recent exhibit of guitars, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston was described
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York’s Guggenheim, which is well known for its unusual exhibits, Heather
Macdonald opined that “the Giorgio Armani show at the Guggenheim re-
minds us that ‘art’ in an art museum these days is optional” (Leo).
There is a tension, then, between the smaller-scale special exhibit, which
principally serves a research or educational function, and the audience-
generating, revenue-producing blockbuster. In line with our earlier discus-
sion, we expect to see diﬀerent museum types specializing in each of these
forms. In particular, university-based museums are likely to be overrepre-
sented among museums mounting specialized exhibits, while public and
nonproﬁt museums, lured by both revenues and audience, will focus on the
blockbuster segment.
Before we can consider the diﬀerent production of special exhibits by
diﬀerent museums, it is useful to touch brieﬂy on the economics of exhibi-
tion production more generally. From the point of view of an industrial-
organization economist and a ﬁnance professor, it is a curious process in-
deed.
Producing special exhibits requires essentially two inputs: curatorial
time and art objects. While museums can and do use visiting curators, the
ability to regularly mount a diverse group of special exhibits requires a sub-
stantial curatorial staﬀ. In the modern blockbuster age, a staﬀ of exhibit
designers has become increasingly important (Silver 1982), further in-
creasing the ﬁxed costs burden for the smaller museum.
A more important barrier to mounting major exhibits by the small mu-
seums is created by the economics of art-object lending. The typical spe-
cial exhibit relies on both a museum’s own objects and borrowed objects.
It is the custom in the museum business that these loans are made without
a fee, although it is usual for the borrowing museum to pay for travel and
insurance costs. Even objects from private collections are borrowed rather
than rented, although there is, at times, some restoration work serving as a
quid pro quo. Initially, one might think that the borrowing tradition would
make it easier for smaller museums to mount exhibits, by lowering costs.
We would argue, however, that this system may discriminate against the
smaller museums. In the barter system used, the smaller museum may ﬁnd
itself with few objects of any appreciable “trade” value and thus more of-
ten ﬁnd its requests for loans refused. Similarly, private exhibitors likely
prefer lending to big-name museums. As with many barter systems, this
one may create an ineﬃciency by reducing the ability of the creative cura-
tor in the smaller museum to exploit his or her skill. As we will shortly ar-
gue, however, the university museum—even the relatively small one—is in
a somewhat advantaged position in the borrowing business.
The evidence suggests that production of traveling exhibitions among
art museums is indeed a highly concentrated business. One way to measure
concentration is to look at participation fees earned by museums. In 1999,
82 Sharon Oster and William N. Goetzmannfor example, the AAMD data indicate that the top four museums provid-
ing data on participation fees earned 55 percent of the total fees earned.3
A decade earlier, in 1989, this ﬁgure was slightly lower. There are no uni-
versity museums among this top list.
Another way to estimate concentration is to look at the originating mu-
seum for recent large exhibits. This allows us to look at some museums that
do not provide AAMD survey data. This information is provided in table
2.5. Of the twenty-one exhibits we identiﬁed in the 1998–99 period with at-
tendance levels over 200,000 in a single museum, the National Gallery had
one-third and the Metropolitan one-fourth of the exhibits. Again, high
concentration is clearly in evidence, public and nonproﬁt museums are rep-
resented in proportion to their place in the pool, and no university muse-
ums are present. One might also notice that almost all of the blockbuster
shows are of Impressionist painters.
The 1999 AAMD list of museums with the highest earned income from
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3. This ﬁgure is based on the approximately two-thirds of the museums responding to this
question.
Table 2.5 Exhibit Census
Exhibit Originating Museum
Blockbusters in 1998, 1999 (attendance  400,000 at one museum)
Monet in the Twentieth Century Boston MFA
The Private Collection of Degas Metropolitan Museum
Van Gogh’s Van Gogh National Gallery
Mary Cassatt: Modern Woman Art Institute, Chicago
Pierre Bonnard MOMA
Cézanne to Van Gogh: Dr. Gachet Metropolitan Museum
John Singer Sargent National Gallery
Renoir’s Portraits Art Institute, Chicago
Mini-blockbuster (attendance  200,000 and  400,000)
Monet: Portrait of Giverny Walters Art Gallery
Alexander Calder National Gallery
A Collector’s Cabinet National Gallery
Manet, Monet, and Gare St. Lazere National Gallery
Degas at the Races National Gallery
Collecting Impressionism High and Seattle
Picasso and the War Years Guggenheim
From Van Eyck to Brueghel Metropolitan Museum
Picasso: Painter and Sculptor in Clay Metropolitan Museum
Hans Hoﬀman in the Metropolitan Metropolitan Museum
Jackson Pollock MOMA
Delacroix: The Late Work Philadelphia Museum
Portraits by Ingres National Gallery
Notes: MFA = Museum of Fine Arts. MOMA = Museum of Modern Art.participation fees is principally dominated by the very largest museums.
Interestingly, the smaller museums earning participation fees are dispro-
portionately university-based museums. Here we see the importance of the
more specialized traveling exhibition to the research life of the university
museum. In 1999, the Harvard University Art Museums were among the
top ten in participation fees among reporting institutions. These fees ap-
pear to be the result of a show mounted in 1998, Inside Out: the New Chi-
nese Art, which traveled throughout the country in 1999 and 2000 and was
mounted in cooperation with the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art.
Williams College, Smith College, and Yale University all earn more from
participation fees than you might expect from their operating budgets. The
Harvard and Yale art galleries routinely mount special exhibitions that
travel to other museums. The university museum may well have cost ad-
vantages in mounting these exhibits, as well as enhanced mission-driven
reasons to support such activity. Here we see some of the advantages of the
university museum in terms of ability to use curatorial talents outside the
museum budget, in the quality of their history of art departments, and in
terms of their ability to borrow, particularly from aﬃliated collectors. Col-
leges with well-endowed alumni may be able to call on these alumni to lend
art to their museum exhibitions and in this way are less hampered by the
borrowing culture of the art world than their similarly sized cohorts.
2.3 Museums as Social Institutions
We have thus far explored the way in which museum ownership and gov-
ernance structure may inﬂuence the emphasis it places on audience attrac-
tion. We turn now to look more directly at the role of a museum vis-à-vis
the social elite in a city.
Founding a museum, sitting on the board of a local arts institution, and
contributing conspicuously to a public museum have long been an avenue
into society. The role of the single philanthropist in founding museums like
the Guggenheim and the Whitney in New York is well known, but the pat-
tern is common in the rest of the country as well. In Minneapolis, T. B.
Walker, who made his fortune in lumber, started the Walker Art Center in
the mid-nineteenth century. The Center for British Art at Yale University
is the gift of philanthropist and collector Paul Mellon. In Chicago, the
Terra Museum of American Art was founded, funded, and named by its
principal donor, Daniel Terra.
What has happened to the museum’s role as a validator of social posi-
tion? As we suggested earlier, the typical museum in the last several
decades has attempted to broaden its public appeal in part to attract new
audiences for revenue reasons. As museums have become democratized in
their exhibitions, there is some question about whether they have lost their
role as promoters of the social elite.
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vice, museums are asked a series of questions pertaining to their “public
support” basis for tax exemption. As part of this set of questions, museums
are required to indicate funds raised from individuals who have con-
tributed over the past four years an amount in excess of 2 percent of the
museum’s total funds. We use this information as one measure of the “elite
focus” of the museum’s funds.
As table 2.6 suggests, there is considerable variation in the reliance of
museums on very large contributions. Some museums report having no pa-
tron who, in the period 1994–97, contributed more than 2 percent of mu-
seum support, while several museums receive almost half of their private
support from this source. Among the museums with substantial reliance
on the large gift are included several very large, high-proﬁle museums (e.g.,
the Whitney Museum and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
[MOMA]), as well as a number of smaller, less well-known museums, in-
cluding the Arkansas Art Center and the Akron Art Museum.
In table 2.7,we report the results of a simple regression intended to tease
out some of the determinants of museum dependence on concentrated do-
nors. The dependent variable is the ratio of donations raised from donors
contributing each in excess of 2 percent of the pool to the total support
pool. As independent variables, we consider two city characteristics: per-
centage of the city population in the top income group ( $150,000 in
1990), and population stability (percentage of the population living in the
same county between 1985 and 1990). Our expectation is that a museum’s
reliance on high-end donors will be positively related to both measures, the
intuition being that the social elites supporting museums have historically
been high-income and stable in residence. In addition, we look at the mu-
seum’s age, recognizing that in early stages museums are often the product
of a few wealthy benefactors, and that through a museum’s life cycle, the
donor pool will tend to spread. While all variables are of the expected sign,
only the income variable is statistically signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance of
the high-income variable is consistent with the conspicuous consump-
tion function of museums. The greater the density of aﬄuent citizens, the
greater the need to signal social status through support of the arts.
It is also interesting to consider the way in which the importance of the
big donor to museums may have changed over time. In panels A and B of
table 2.8, we have brieﬂy summarized the history of the museums listed in
the AAMD survey founded in two historical periods: before 1920, a period
in which many of the premier U.S. museums were founded, and since 1960.
We note ﬁrst that the ownership structure in these newer museums paral-
lels those of the earlier museums: Two-thirds of the new museums are non-
proﬁts, and one-third, public. There is no indication of an evolutionary
trend toward one “ideal” museum form, the way we have seen in other ar-
eas of nonproﬁt management. A somewhat higher than expected fraction
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Proportion of Funds
Museum from Large Donors
1. Akron Art Museum .1899962
2. Albright-Knox Art Gallery 0
3. Allentown Art Museum .0012145
4. Arkansas Arts Center .4329223
5. Asia Society and Museum .1664267
6. Butler Institute of American Art .056930
7. Boston Museum of Fine Art 0
8. Chrysler Museum 0
9. Columbus Museum of Art .0743780
10. Columbus Museum .1177242
11. Contemporary Arts Center 0
12. Cummer Museum of Art .0296322
13. Currier Gallery of Art .0756367
14. Dallas Museum of Art .0680886
15. Dayton Art Institute .0931211
16. Detroit Institute of Arts .0431507
17. Dia Center for the Arts .3419761
18. Flint Institute of Arts .0997698
19. Honolulu Academy of Arts .1077176
20. Huntington Library and Art Gallery .1057051
21. Huntington Museum of Art .0330222
22. Huntsville Museum of Art 0
23. Indianapolis Museum of Art .1308966
24. International Center of Photography .0312683
25. Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum .0789347
26. JB Speed Art Museum 0
27. Jewish Museum .0891177
28. Joslyn Art Museum 0
29. Long Beach Museum of Art .0056818
30. Marion Koogler McNay Art Museum .1067609
31. Metropolitan Museum of Art .0564407
32. Milwaukee Art Museum .0731025
33. Mint Museum of Art .0057806
34. Museum of Contemporary Art 0
35. Neuberger Museum of Art .2936345
36. New Museum of Contemporary Art 0
37. New Orleans Museum of Art .0376919
38. Newark Museum .0036008
39. North Carolina Museum of Art .1515550
40. Palm Springs Desert Museum .1635293
41. Parrish Art Museum .0595174
42. Philadelphia Museum of Art .0298572
43. Philbrook Museum of Art .1342124
44. Phoenix Art Museum .2005516
45. Pierpont Morgan Library .2166278
46. Portland Art Museum .1950636
47. San Antonio Museum of Art .0700298
48. San Diego Museum of Art .0187342of the new museums do, however, appear to be university based. Most sig-
niﬁcantly, nearly every one of the new museums—including those associ-
ated with universities—was founded by a large gift of money or a gift of art
by a major donor. Indeed, the role of the single major donor appears, if
anything, to have increased over time. Interestingly, many of the new do-
nors come from the same industry bases as those in the earlier period—
manufacturing, oil, and transportation. Our evidence suggests remarkable
stability in the prevalence of founding donors and the proﬁle of those do-
nors in the museum world.
2.4 Museums as Aesthetic Institutions
In the analyses thus far, we have emphasized the ways in which serving
popular audiences and serving a narrower elite group compete for museum
attention. While recent scholarship has underscored the contrasts in these
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Proportion of Funds
Museum from Large Donors
49. San Francisco Museum of Modern Art .3304738
50. San Jose Museum of Art .0114623
51. Santa Barbara Museum of Art .1068513
52. Seattle Art Museum .0058311
53. Southeastern Center .3356010
54. Studio Museum in Harlem 0
55. Tampa Museum of Art 0
56. Telfair Museum of Art 0
57. Textile Museum .1806287
58. Toledo Museum of Art .3462301
59. Wadsworth Atheneum .0241641
60. Walker Art Center .0260312
61. Whitney Museum of American Art .2245290
62. Winterthur Museum .0056559
63. Worchester Art Museum .0281015
Table 2.7 Determinants of High Donor Funding
Independent Variable Coeﬃcient T-statistic
Constant –.045 (–.30)
High-income .961 (2.31)*
Population stability .002 (.82)
Museum age –.0002 (–.41)
R2 .11
N 63
*Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.Table 2.8 U.S. Museum, by Year Founded and Donor
Museum Year Donor (industry)
A. Founded Since 1960
Amon Carter Museum 1961 Amon Carter (publishing)
Asian Art Museum of San Francisco 1966 Avery Brundage (construction)
Brandywine River Museum 1971 DuPont (chemicals)
Contemporary Arts Center 1976 State
David and Alfred Smart Museum of Art  1974 Smarts (publishing)
(University of Chicago)
Dia Center for the Arts 1974 DeMenil (oil and banking)
Elvehjem Museum of Art  1962 Faculty idea: no money
(University of Wisconsin)
Georgia O’Keefe Museum 1997 Anne and John Marion 
(former Sotheby’s head)
Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden 1966 Hirshhorn (ﬁnance, mining)
Huntsville Museum of Art 1970 City
Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art  1973 Johnson (manufacturing)
(Cornell University)
Jack S. Blanton Museum of Art  1963 Blanton (oil)
(University of Texas)
Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Art Museum 1966 Voorhees-Zimmerli (ﬁnance)
(Rutgers)
Krannert Art Museum 1961 Herman Krannert (box manufacturing)
(University of Illinois)
Museum of Contemporary Art 1967 Daniel Brenner
National Museum of African Art 1964 Government
National Portrait Gallery 1962 Government
Neuberger Museum of Art  1974 Roy Neuberger (ﬁnance)
(SUNY Purchase)
New Museum of Contemporary Art 1977 City
Salvador Dali Museum 1971 A. R. Morse (industry)
Samuel Harn Museum 1981 Samuel Harn (manufacturing)
San Antonio Museum of Art 1981 City
San Jose Museum of Art 1969 City
St. Petersburg Museum of Fine Arts 1961 M. Acheson Stuart (publishing)
Studio Museum in Harlem 1967 Volunteer founders
Tampa Museum of Art 1967 DeMenils (oil and banking)
UCLA Hammer Museum 1994 Hammer (chemicals)
University of California, Berkeley,  1970 Hans Hoﬀmann (artist)
Art Museum
University of Iowa Museum of Art 1967 Owen and Leone Elliot
Wexner Center for the Arts 1989 Wexner (retail)
Yale Center for British Art 1977 Andrew Mellon (transport and aluminum)
B. Founded before 1920
Albright-Knox Art Gallery 1826 John Albright (steel)
Art Institute of Chicago 1879 Group of businessmen
Baltimore Museum of Art 1914 M. Carey Thomas (president of Bryn Mawr; 
railroad money inherited)
Brooklyn Museum of Art 1823 Community group
Butler Institute of American Art 1919 Joseph Butler (manufacturing)
Carnegie Museum of Art 1896 Andrew Carnegie (steel)
Cincinnati Art Museum 1896 Citizen groupTable 2.8 (continued)
Museum Year Donor (industry)
Cleveland Museum of Art 1913 Huntington (oil); Kelley (development); 
Hurlburt (banks)
Cooper-Hewitt National Design Museum 1887 Cooper grandchildren (railroads)
Corcoran Gallery of Art 1869 William Corcoran (banking)
Crocker Art Museum 1885 Edwin Crocker (railroads)
Currier Gallery of Art 1919 Moody Currier (banking)
Dallas Museum of Art 1903 Citizen group
Davis Museum 1889 Wellesley College
Dayton Art Institute 1919 Julia Paterson Carnell 
(National Cash Register)
Delaware Art Museum 1912 Citizen group
Denver Art Museum 1883 Municipal
Detroit Institute of Arts 1885 Brearly (journalism)
Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco 1894 DeYoung (publishing)
Freer Gallery of Art 1916 Charles Freer (railroads)
Frick Collection 1920 Henry Frick (steel)
Harvard University Art Museums (Fogg) 1895 William Hayes Fogg (China trade)
Henry Art Gallery 1917 Horace Henry (railroads)
Huntington Library and Art Gallery 1919 Henry Huntington (railroads)
Indianapolis Museum of Art 1883 John Herron
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum 1903 Isabella Gardner (commerce)
Los Angeles County Museum of Art 1910 City
Memory Art Gallery of Rochester 1913 Mrs. J. S. Watson (telegraph)
Metropolitan Museum of Art 1870 Group of businessmen
Michael C. Carlos Museum 1876 Emory; Carlos (alcohol distributor)
Milwaukee Art Museum 1888
Minneapolis Institute of Arts 1915
Mississippi Museum of Art 1911 Citizen association
Munson-Williams-Proctor Arts Institute 1919 Munson (banking); Williams (politics); 
Proctor (manufacture)
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 1870 Group of citizens (Henry Kidder, ﬁnance; 
W. Endicott, dry goods; Charles Eliot,
Harvard president)
New Orleans Museum of Art 1911 Isaac Delgado (sugar)
Newark Museum 1909 Louis Bamberger (retail)
Parrish Art Museum 1898 Samuel Parrish
Philadelphia Museum of Art 1876 Group: Centennial related
Phillips Collection 1897 Duncan Phillips (steel)
Portland (Maine) Museum of Art 1883 Margaret deMedici Sweat (retail)
Portland (Oregon) Art Museum 1892 Henry Corbett (bands)
Saint Louis Art Museum 1892 Group: St. Louis Fair
Seattle Art Museum 1917 Russell Fuller (medicine)
Telfair Museum of Art 1875 Alexander Telfair (trade; agriculture)
Toledo Museum of Art 1901 Edward Libbey (glass)
Wadsworth Atheneum 1842 D. Wadsworth (insurance)
Walker Art Center 1879 T. Walker (lumber)
Walters Art Museum 1908 William Walters (railroads)
Worcester Art Museum 1896 Stephen Salisbury (trade)
Yale University Art Gallery 1832 John Trumbull (artist)
Note: Includes all museums listed in the AAMD directory.two objectives, it is worth considering the commonalities as well. An art
museum is, for the most part, a spatial technology for facilitating the per-
sonal experience of art. While connoisseurship might be the elite extreme
of the aesthetic experience, and art education the populist extreme, they
can be expected to share some common kernel or at least to be connected
by a continuum of personal experience. Are there cultural commonalities
in the “high” and “low” experience of art? Can a single institution serve
both extremes? To explore the question of whether common and elite artis-
tic tastes are connected, we used time-series analysis of art prices and at-
tendance at museums.
Clearly, art serves in some measure as an investment good, and thus its
price will reﬂect other forces in investment markets. This has been the di-
rection of most of the prior literature. For example, Goetzmann and
Spiegel (1995) take art as a ﬁxed percentage of wealth and show how this
may explain the covariation of art with equity markets. More recently, Ait-
Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2001) show how this covariation between lux-
ury goods like art might account for the magnitude of the equity premium.
To date, however, there has been little theoretical work that links a social-
pecking-order framework to the prices of the luxury goods and the aes-
thetic experience directly. On the other hand, such frameworks are com-
mon in other parts of the ﬁnance literature. For example, “keeping up with
the Joneses” models in the asset pricing literature, such as Bakshi and Chen
(1996) and Campbell and Cochrane (2001), show how competitive, socially
determined preferences may aﬀect security prices. A natural question to
ask is whether local social competition determines the demand for con-
spicuous consumption as well and what role museums might play in this
competition.
Economists have long debated the issue of whether art provides a fair
rate of return to investors. The natural presumption is that some compo-
nent of the return to art investment is the aesthetic dividend that accrues to
the owner—the private beneﬁts enjoyed by viewing the work. Neglecting
expectations about future resale, the entire value of owning a painting
would be the capitalized stream of the aesthetic dividends. Given the evi-
dence on the social role of art institutions presented above, one could con-
ceivably substitute “social” for “aesthetic,” however. Museums deliver a
ﬂow of these nonmonetary dividends to participants: The aesthetic divi-
dends are delivered through viewership, the social dividends are delivered
through board association, membership, and attendance. To the extent
that there are common tastes and desires for social signaling, we might ex-
pect that measures of the dividend ﬂow and its capitalized value to covary.
Indeed, our cross-sectional regressions found a relationship between at-
tendance—i.e., the demand for the ﬂow—and the value of the stock. We
also might expect art prices to covary with attendance. By the same token,
the existence of common aesthetic tastes and demand for social signaling
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tion, we test these two propositions with time-series data on museum at-
tendance and the returns to art investment.
2.4.1 Data
It is surprisingly diﬃcult to obtain time-series data on museum atten-
dance. The AAMD was unwilling to provide us access to their annual sur-
vey for multiple years. As an alternative, we contacted the top ﬁfty art mu-
seums in the country and asked for their annual attendance numbers.
Many had to reconstruct this information speciﬁcally for us. In total, we
were able to obtain annual attendance ﬁgures for twenty-six museums for
diﬀerent intervals of time. Table 2.9 reports this time-series data. In order
to test hypotheses about the covariation in art prices and museum atten-
dance, we construct an equal-weighted index of annual percentage changes
in museum attendance from this data. As table 2.9 suggests, the composi-
tion of this changes as museums enter and exit the sample, but it provides
the best measure we can get of the annual ﬂuctuations in national art mu-
seum attendance. Table 2.10reports the statistical characteristics of the in-
dex for diﬀerent subperiods of the data.
For our measure of returns to investment in art, we use the Mei and
Moses (2002) art price indexes. These are estimated from repeated sales of
art works auctioned at major houses from 1875 to the present. The technol-
ogy is similar to Goetzmann (1993)—it calculates pretax and precommis-
sion investment returns based upon the auction-to-auction price relative,
conditional upon resale. Hence, those works that did not sell after once ap-
pearing at auction have no inﬂuence on the estimation of the time series of
returns. For our purposes, we are chieﬂy interested in the intertemporal vari-
ation in art prices. In small sample, repeat-sales estimators may induce neg-
ative serial correlation in the series estimates. However the Mei and Moses
data set is large, and thus we may take their index estimation as a fairly ac-
curate representation of the trends in art prices over the past forty years.
2.4.2 Do Art Returns Explain Museum Attendance?
If art prices and museum attendance both reﬂect ﬂuctuations in the com-
mon component of demand for the aesthetic or social dividend, we should
expect to ﬁnd some correlation between attendance and the art index. Fig-
ure 2.2plots the cumulated growth in art prices and in museum attendance
for the equal-weighed index and for a few representative cities. From 1961
to 2000, art prices appreciated at a considerably higher rate than the
growth rate in attendance at art museums. The plot suggests little relation-
ship between attendance and art prices, however. Art prices spiked in the
late 1980s and 1990, while the attendance graph shows no such trend.
To more formally examine the relationship between art prices and at-
tendance trends, we regress the equal-weighted index of annual percentage
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(2002) art index. We also perform each regression separately by city, and ﬁ-
nally we stack all cities together and estimate the coeﬃcient on art under
the assumption of equality of coeﬃcients. Table 2.11 reports the regression
results, showing no evidence of a relationship between attendance and art
returns. Assuming our tests have power, we can interpret this negative evi-
dence as favoring the hypothesis that the demand at the high end and the
demand at the low end for the nonmonetary dividends supplied by art are
essentially disjoint.
Figure 2.2 also suggests little relationship among the museums in the
Table 2.9 Museum Attendance Data
Year
1. 1960 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2. 1961 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
3. 1962 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
4. 1963 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
5. 1964 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
6. 1965 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
7. 1966 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,665,388 n.a.
8. 1967 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,887,135 n.a.
9. 1968 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,174,674 n.a.
10. 1969 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133,870 n.a.
11. 1970 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 610,102 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,384,448 n.a.
12. 1971 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 487,753 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,185,741 n.a.
13. 1972 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 450,817 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,203,999 n.a.
14. 1973 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 450,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,124,870 n.a.
15. 1974 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 486,847 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,204,857 n.a.
16. 1975 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 552,299 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,026,918 n.a.
17. 1976 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 596,419 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,425,704 n.a.
18. 1977 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 590,075 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,350,302 n.a.
19. 1978 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 541,557 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,750,039 n.a.
20. 1979 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 444,094 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 357,577 n.a.
21. 1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 379,096 n.a. 545,152 n.a. n.a. 506,956 n.a.
22. 1981 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 396,695 n.a. 596,223 n.a. n.a. 586,587 n.a.
23. 1982 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 489,917 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 372,182 n.a.
24. 1983 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 502,635 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 415,000 n.a.
25. 1984 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 63,591 470,692 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 579,569 n.a.
26. 1985 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 73,993 509,292 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 914,978 n.a.
27. 1986 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 71,701 456,824 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 421,296 n.a.
28. 1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 83,762 515,058 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,099,440 n.a.
29. 1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 73,665 483,964 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 860,689 85,333
30. 1989 n.a. n.a. 291,100 n.a. n.a. 77,656 442,238 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 950,833 80,349
31. 1990 n.a. 315,047 442,200 n.a. n.a. 67,097 497,482 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 663,869 73,978
32. 1991 n.a. 302,196 419,600 n.a. n.a. 84,212 542,813 n.a. 422,464 n.a. n.a. 1,003,059 98,458
33. 1992 n.a. 483,347 427,000 n.a. n.a. 66,535 534,676 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 848,099 79,499
34. 1993 n.a. 328,714 410,700 n.a. n.a. 72,423 492,624 29,610 n.a. n.a. n.a. 612,005 84,952
35. 1994 n.a. 322,073 422,300 n.a. n.a. 67,656 553,503 28,943 n.a. n.a. n.a. 551,935 88,294
36. 1995 n.a. 311,577 380,000 n.a. n.a. 74,698 484,849 25,469 n.a. n.a. n.a. 541,308 83,733
37. 1996 61,868 347,996 458,100 54,991 78,966 71,393 463,938 34,925 n.a. n.a. n.a. 663,429 87,273
38. 1997 62,666 317,090 415,200 84,724 65,003 71,875 487,861 45,526 n.a. n.a. n.a. 602,141 102,682
39. 1998 85,117 340,677 431,500 92,954 86,802 66,284 467,064 48,689 n.a. 1,750,000 n.a. 554,024 85,678
40. 1999 91,369 277,589 501,661 90,432 109,000 68,081 509,377 32,331 n.a. 1,500,000 481,049 1,328,765 75,398
41. 2000 73,880 290,299 n.a. 100,156 120,000 72,134 534,162 25,545 380,425 1,400,000 138,016 597,409 110,910














92 Sharon Oster and William N. Goetzmannsample. This is even more surprising. While the low correlation between at-
tendance and art prices may not be surprising given that auctions reﬂect de-
mands by a relatively aﬄuent clientele, (indeed, a group whose wealth may
depend upon a diﬀerent set of factors than does the wealth of those who reg-
ularly attend art galleries) it is surprising to us to see low intercity relation-
ships in museum attendance trends. In fact, the average correlation among
the cities, reported in table 2.12, is close to zero. One way to interpret this is
that all art appreciation, like all politics, is local. In some ways, this result
reinforces our earlier ﬁnding on the importance of both city- and museum-
speciﬁc factors in determining attendance patterns. An alternative explana-
Table 2.9 (continued)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 99,196
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 92,989
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 94,372
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 83,440
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 79,302
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 92,019
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 101,424
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 114,211
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41,811 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 131,811
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 43,641 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 126,253
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 43,850 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 119,004
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47,575 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 101,482
2,225,530 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 59,770 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 120,946
2,272,212 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 99,706 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 118,366
2,590,851 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 123,722 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 261,342 87,496
3,326,012 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 84,338 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 231,829 96,293
2,871,417 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89,519 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 278,981 144,290
3,337,040 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 86,779 n.a. n.a. n.a. 417,380 n.a. 401,489 75,392
3,235,684 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 77,228 n.a. n.a. n.a. 436,040 n.a. 458,547 98,546
4,687,277 490,888 n.a. n.a. n.a. 76,031 n.a. n.a. n.a. 423,362 n.a. 369,791 96,423
3,369,934 390,604 n.a. n.a. n.a. 59,551 n.a. n.a. n.a. 645,799 n.a. 441,405 106,677
3,574,138 327,431 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 360,793 n.a. 637,578 110,223
3,232,876 341,901 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 415,340 n.a. 420,150 99,346
4,333,918 335,142 n.a. n.a. n.a. 61,817 n.a. n.a. n.a. 401,305 n.a. 426,547 110,914
3,945,708 437,685 n.a. n.a. n.a. 61,145 n.a. n.a. n.a. 396,554 n.a. 387,743 97,130
3,889,471 491,603 n.a. n.a. n.a. 68,281 n.a. n.a. n.a. 352,099 n.a. 310,595 117,746
3,290,133 507,507 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 473,259 n.a. 340,781 185,951
4,871,698 511,838 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 473,074 n.a. 457,471 118,467
3,767,018 665,887 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 334,033 n.a. 399,564 137,867
4,585,554 560,187 n.a. n.a. n.a. 48,118 n.a. n.a. n.a. 350,044 220,000 313,143 135,981
4,329,474 510,992 n.a. n.a. n.a. 75,713 n.a. n.a. n.a. 335,996 200,000 338,090 155,085
4,479,344 760,868 n.a. n.a. n.a. 81,345 n.a. n.a. n.a. 371,672 247,000 260,800 119,834
4,453,441 544,804 n.a. 52,494 n.a. 103,589 n.a. n.a. 671,303 356,801 275,000 273,986 120,630
4,399,542 579,466 5,597,973 54,174 n.a. 119,211 542,656 n.a. 919,191 406,910 306,000 273,426 121,436
4,308,881 1,247,768 4,042,044 55,092 n.a. 78,836 447,436 n.a. 745,526 456,825 255,000 231,100 103,786
4,657,430 1,259,642 4,684,095 40,268 873,515 72,188 479,738 n.a. 788,717 499,693 267,000 293,040 96,873
4,566,579 n.a. 4,731,418 87,689 841,683 85,385 645,738 n.a. 789,182 509,123 200,000 421,867 100,968
5,309,076 1,801,924 5,637,841 98,309 1,148,816 84,797 553,853 209,312 875,118 516,568 275,000 291,800 98,848
4,950,136 1,323,380 6,198,523 123,212 734,149 68,144 653,016 225,685 1,048,302 518,398 344,000 385,836 111,547
4,850,913 1,251,094 5,969,528 150,436 748,966 76,722 494,848 216,340 1,029,638 430,252 143,676 464,244 n.a.
5,152,884 1,784,332 5,126,954 69,487 645,999 69,980 499,944 212,057 1,129,366 581,590 110,952 570,255 116,400















Does Governance Matter? 93tion is that traveling shows are important determinants of attendance with
the biggest drawing shows are in diﬀerent cities in diﬀerent years.
2.5 Conclusions
Art museums in the United States come in a range of ownership forms.
In this paper, we have found striking diﬀerences in the performance of
Table 2.10 Summary Statistics, Annual Percentage Changes in Attendance Index of
American Art Museums, 1961–2000
Geographical Growth Average Growth Standard Deviation
1961–1970 –0.0105 –0.0100 0.0930
1971–1980 0.0422 0.0461 0.1064
1981–1990 0.0307 0.0414 0.1046
1991–2000 0.0205 0.0414 0.0599
94 Sharon Oster and William N. Goetzmann
Fig. 2.2 Comparison of the performance of art at auction to measures of growth
in attendance
Notes: For an equal-weighted index of museum attendance, and for three museums: Los
Angeles County Museum, New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Whitney Mu-
seum of American Art. Equal-weighted average of available museums, and three large insti-
tutionsthese museums that are consistent with our expectations about diﬀerences
in institutional economic incentives. Based on our work comparing art
prices and museum attendance, we further ﬁnd that the levels of demand
for art by the various sectors of the market are disjoint. In this light, it is in-
teresting to consider the recent Italian proposal to begin moving some of
the major museums into the nongovernmental sector. Our own work sug-
gests that changing governance in this way may well change the operating
behavior of those museums, perhaps in ways unanticipated by the govern-
ment.
Our work also suggests that art collections housed in museums, al-
though often treated as noncommercial assets, have considerable ability to
generate revenues. Moreover, the productivity of a collection varies signif-
icantly by the characteristics of the city in which it is located. In our his-
Table 2.11 Regressions of Equal-Weighted Percent Changes in Attendance on Art
Returns
Coeﬃcient T-statistic NR 2
Asia Society and Museum –0.033 –0.037 4 0.001
Baltimore Museum of Art 0.381 1.006 10 0.112
Dallas Museum of Art 0.210 –0.651 10 0.050
DeCordova Museum and Sculpture Park –1.179 –2.203 4 0.708
Georgia Museum of Art 0.962 1.629 4 0.570
Johnson –0.064 –0.480 16 0.016
Huntington Library and Art Gallery –0.175 –2.181 30 0.145
Illinois Art Gallery –0.747 –1.298 7 0.252
Indianapolis Museum of Art 0.000 n.a. 1 n.a.
J. Paul Getty Museum 0.528 n.a. 2 1.000
Kimbell Art Museum 0.000 n.a. 1 n.a.
L.A. County Museum of Art 0.286 0.742 34 0.017
Memorial Art Gallery of Rochester –0.394 –1.362 12 0.156
Metropolitan Museum of Art –0.131 –0.851 28 0.027
Museum of Fine Arts –0.451 –1.315 19 0.092
National Gallery of Art 0.123 0.302 7 0.018
Norton Museum of Art –0.749 –0.665 8 0.069
Philadelphia Museum of Art –1.502 –3.109 5 0.763
Princeton University Art Museum 0.178 0.863 25 0.031
Saint Louis Art Museum 0.506 1.035 7 0.l77
Dali 0.127 0.145 3 0.021
Guggenheim Museum 0.001 0.002 8 0.000
Walker Art Center –0.143 –0.709 23 0.023
Walters Art Museum –0.490 –1.43 11 0.127
Whitney Museum of American Art 0.320 1.517 26 0.088
Yale University Art Gallery 0.152 1.087 38 0.032
Equal-weighted index –0.008 –0.122 40 0.004
Stacked regression –0.014 –0.215 343 0.001
Note: City-by-city regression, index regression, and stacked regression.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































etorical work on the relationship between social elite and museums, we ﬁnd
remarkable stability: big donors continue to found new museums and sup-
port those museums with largesse earned in traditional, old-economy
ways.
In this paper, we have focused on the role of governance structure in mu-
seum decision making. An interesting example of the dynamics of museum
governance can be witnessed in the extraordinary set of western American
art collections accessible to the public in Denver, Colorado. In the 1980s
and early 1990s, the Denver area had not one, but three, superb collections
of art of the American West. The Museum of Western Art (MWA) was
founded in the early 1980s as a private, not-for-proﬁt institution by cattle-
man William Foxley to display his personal collection of paintings and
sculpture, which were on loan to the organization for which he served as
the chairman of the board. The MWA collection focused on nineteenth-
and early-twentieth-century “masterpieces” of western art—from the ac-
tion paintings of Remington and Russell to the later, much-admired mod-
ernist paintings by Taos and Santa Fe artists. The Philip Anschutz collec-
tion, similarly, is composed of major works of western American art, and
it was somewhat more widely known than the MWA collection. Anschutz
amassed a fortune on oil, railroads, and telecommunications, and, like
William Foxley, began to collect prize western American paintings and
sculpture as a private collector. Over the past two decades, he has exhibited
it widely to the public by publishing a catalogue of the collection and un-
derwriting traveling exhibitions of the works to major art museums around
the country. The Denver Art Museum (DAM) recently organized a show
of the Anschutz collection that traveled to the Jocelyn Museum in Omaha
and the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C. The third major collection
in Denver was in the Denver Art Museum itself. Dorothy and William
Harmsen, founders of the Jolly Rancher Candy Company, assembled a col-
lection of noteworthy western paintings and American Indian art over sev-
eral decades, which they donated in 2001 to the DAM. The artists whose
works are represented in the Harmsen collection are essentially the same as
those in the Foxley and Anschutz collections, but they are a part of a public
museum, not a private collection or a private, not-for-proﬁt museum.
The constellation of collections is instructive, ﬁrst because of the appar-
ent rivalry within Denver among some of the leading businessmen at the
time to form top western art collections—perhaps as a way of “keeping
score” and perhaps as a way of demonstrating reﬁnement, taste, and “west-
ern” values. In this respect, it is tempting to draw a parallel to the rivalries
among turn-of-the-century Pittsburgh’s captains of industry as they vied
to buy European masterpieces.
Perhaps more interesting for our purposes is that these founders chose
diﬀerent governance forms for the context of their philanthropy. The col-
lection of the Museum of Western Art, until it was ultimately moved and
Does Governance Matter? 97partly dispersed, was largely in the control of the founder, who was able to
sell and to augment the exhibit. The museum relied, to a large extent, upon
his ﬁnancial support. Nevertheless, it was a not-for-proﬁt organization
with a mission to serve the public through its exhibitions. The Anschutz
collection, on the other hand, was not necessarily formed with the public
good in mind: The founder has complete control and no special mandate
to use it for philanthropic goals, although lending to a traveling show is
certainly a beneﬁt to the public. Although Anschutz and Foxley undoubt-
edly had the option to give their collections to the Denver Art Museum,
they both chose to maintain control of their collections to a greater or
lesser degree. In contrast, the Harmsen collection is no longer under the
control of the founder, nor does it receive top billing at the museum. The
DAM prides itself on displaying an extensive survey collection of world
art, as opposed to a regionally focused collection. While Harmsen can
probably exert inﬂuence on the mission of the museum through his philan-
thropic activities, the director of the DAM has a larger range of choices
about the strategic deployment of the institution’s assets. In addition, the
DAM serves a broader constituency—a community with an interest in
world art, not solely focused on western Americana. Thus, institutional
forms facilitate diﬀerent donor and community goals, even when the art it-
self is similar.
References
Ait-Sahalia, Yacine, Jonathan A. Parker, and Motohiro Yogo. 2001. Luxury goods
and the equity premium. NBER Working Paper no. W8417. Cambridge, Mass.:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Association of Museum Directors. 1989. Statistical survey of members. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Association of Museum Directors.
———. 1999. Statistical survey of members.Washington, D.C.: Association of Mu-
seum Directors.
Anheier, Helmut, and Stefan Toepler. 1998. Commerce and the muse: Are art mu-
seums becoming commercial? In To proﬁt or not to proﬁt, ed. Burton Weisbrod,
233–48. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bakshi, Gurdip, and Zhiwu Chen. 1996. The spirit of capitalism and stock market
prices. American Economic Review 86 (March): 133–57.
Boylan, Patrick. 1999. Universities and museums: Past, present and future. Mu-
seum Management and Curatorship 18 (1): 43–56.
Campbell, John, and John Cochrane. 2001. By force of habit: A consumption-
based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 107 (April): 205–51.
d’Harnoncourt, Anne, Paul DiMaggio, Marilyn Perry, and James Wood. 1991. The
museum and the public. In The economics of art museums, ed. Martin Feldstein,
35–60. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
98 Sharon Oster and William N. GoetzmannDiMaggio, Paul. 1986. Nonproﬁt enterprise in the arts. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press,
———. 1987. Nonproﬁt organizations in the production and distribution of cul-
ture. In The nonproﬁt sector, ed. Walter W. Powell, 195–220. New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press.
Goetzmann, William N. 1993. Accounting for taste: An analysis of art returns over
three centuries. American Economic Review 83 (5): 1370–76.
Goetzmann, William N., and Matthew Spiegel. 1995. Private value components
and the winner’s curse in an art index. European Economic Review39 (May): 549–
55.
Grana, Cesar. 1971. The private lives of public museums: Can art be democratic?
In Fact and symbol: Essays in the sociology of art and literature, 95–111. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Hansmann, Henry. 1981. The role of nonproﬁt enterprise. Yale Law Journal
89:835–901.
Ingham, John N. 1997. Reaching for respectability: The Pittsburgh industrial elite
at the turn of the century. In Collection in the Gilded Age: Art and patronage in
Pittsburgh, 1890–1910,ed. Gabriel P. Weisberg, DeCourcy E. McIntosh, and Al-
ison McQueen, Pittsburgh: Frick Art and Historical Center.
Kotler, Neil, and Philip Kotler. 2001. Can museums be all things to all people? In
Museum Management and Curatorship 18 (3): 271–87.
Leo, John. 2001. But where’s the art? US News and World Report, 14 May, p. 14.
MacDonald, Heather. 2001. The Met’s triumphant democratic elitism. City Jour-
nal 11 (Winter): 76–91.
Mei, J. P., and Michael Moses. 2002. Art as an investment and the underperfor-
mance of masterpieces: Evidence from 1875–2000. American Economics Review,
forthcoming.
Meyer, Ruth Krueger, and Madeleine Fidfell Beaufort. 1997. The rage for collect-
ing: Beyond Pittsburgh in the Gilded Age. In Collection in the Gilded Age: Art and
patronage in Pittsburgh, 1890–1910,ed. Gabriel P. Weisberg, DeCourcy E. McIn-
tosh, and Alison McQueen, Pittsburgh: Frick Art and Historical Center.
Rosett, Richard. 1991. Art museums in the U.S.: A ﬁnancial portrait. In The eco-
nomics of art museums, ed. Martin Feldstein, 129–76. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Silver, Stuart. 1982. Almost everyone loves a winner. Museum News (November–
December): 25–35.
Temin, Peter. 1991. An economic history of American art museums. In The eco-
nomics of art museums, ed. Martin Feldstein, 179–93. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Does Governance Matter? 99